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Abstract
The teaching o f  the ‘prosperity cult’ that a Christian has a right to wealth is very much a product o f 
the modem age. Similarly the ontological argument for the existence o f  God belongs very much to 
its own era. There is no developmental link between the two, but nevertheless they are connected 
logically. Both argue from a conception o f  God as infinite - a conception which assures on the one 
hand the existence o f  God, and on the other the receipt o f  blessings prayed for by a Christian. 
Although such results may well follow  from  that assumption, these m ust require qualification, 
especially in the light o f  a dynamic rather than a static world. Both ontological argument and  
prosperity teaching hold questionable assumptions on the nature o f  perfection and o f  comparabil­
ity. A  Christian conception o f  God must however mean that material blessing cannot be a right in 
this world as is claimed by ‘prosperity teaching\ simply on the grounds o f  conception and prayer.
1. INTRODUCTION
The teachings of such as Kenneth Hagin, characterized by the term prosperity cult are 
very much a product of their times. I have elsewhere (Williams, 1985) described the 
features of the m odern world that provided fertile ground for what I believe to be a 
heresy so attractive to the milieu of modern man, at least in the West. O ur society is so 
acquisitive in its general ethos that theology cannot remain unaffected by it. (For a 
good description of this, and how it has affected theology, see Frank, 1986.) The 
justification of the increasing prosperity of men, and particularly the teaching that a 
Christian has a  god-given right and a god-given means to such ever increasing wealth 
could only have arisen  in such a  society as ours. (For fuller explanations of the 
prosperity cult, see Williams, 1985 or Sarles, 1986.) It could never have taken root 
either in a different time, nor could it take root in a society which does not know such 
wealth as ours.
Many attem pts have been made to refute this teaching. These may be either from a 
Biblical perspective, pointing out the deficiencies of its fundamentalist approach to the 
Scriptures, which takes all texts as applicable to later readers without reference to the 
original situation or to  the rest of the Bible, both o f which may well modify their 
understanding (cf Williams, 1985:21, of Mark, 11:24). O ther criticisms are made from
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experience, pointing out the dangers that result from an acceptance of its practices. I 
want here to consider the prosperity teaching from a different perspective, seeking to 
show the deficiencies in the assumptions of the approach. H ere help comes from an 
unexpected source, the traditional ontological argument for the existence of God.
This argument is deeply embedded in the philosophical world view that dominated the 
M iddle Ages. Today it is hardly more than a curiosity due to the collapse of its 
presuppositions, although it still stim ulates a considerable am ount of intellectual 
activity particularly among logicians (cf Barnes, 1972, Plantinga, 1968), because it is 
unique among the classical arguments for God in that it alone is an argument a priori, 
simply from the nature of God and not from the world. Nevertheless with the em er­
gence of the modern world in the Enlightenment and particularly with the devastating 
attack on the ontological argument by the apostle of the Enlightenment, Kant, it has 
ceased to have any real value. The modern world is different from that of the Middle 
Ages, and in it the ontological argument does not find a place.
It is clear that it is impossible to discover any intellectual link between the ontological 
argument and prosperity teaching. They belong to different eras and different world 
views. Historically the ontological argument precedes any hint of prosperity teaching, 
but there is no developing line of thought from the argument. On the other hand, the 
arguments of prosperity teaching can be traced back to different sources. I see it as an 
amalgam of two streams (Williams, 1987). On the one hand there is ‘positive thought’ 
embodied most clearly in the teaching of Norman Vincent Peale, which has its own 
antecedents in the Victorious Life movement and perhaps Christian Science, but is a 
direct result of the American ethos. It really only emerged with the modern world and 
as a result of that world, particularly in America. On the other hand a far more ancient 
root, the giving of G od’s power to men, goes back to the time of the apostles and even 
beyond them to the prophets and judges of the Old Testament. Nevertheless it is only 
again with the modern world that Pentecostalism, and more recently the Charismatic 
movement, have broken in on the world. Neither of these has any contact whatsoever 
with medieval philosophy; in fact, among these movements there is rather a despising 
of any form  of in te llectualism . In teresting ly  S arles (1986:350) sees the anti- 
intellectualism of much evangelicalism as a root of the prosperity cult.
However, although there is no connection whatsoever between the two, there is a 
similarity of logic that comes to light. Thus the well-understood arguments which 
pertain to the ontological argument are also applicable to the modern innovation of 
prosperity teaching, and will clarify its assumptions and failings.
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2. DEFINING TH E CONCEPTS
2.1 Conception
It is well known that the ontological argument was formulated in two main ways. The 
most famous is associated with the name of Anselm of Canterbury. H e started with the 
premise, obviously true to him, and to anyone of that era, that God must be perfect. In 
other words he had a conception of what God is like. From this he argued that what 
exists must be more perfect than what does not exist, and therefore, from the very 
conception of G od, He must necessarily exist. The form ulation of D escartes was 
slightly different. Again starting from the conception of God as perfect, he argued 
rather that a perfect being must have everything, and existence is then one thing that 
can be possessed. Again, God must necessarily exist. The attack of Kant here is more 
devastating to D escartes’ form of the argum ent, but is also applicable to Anselm. 
Existence, he said, is not a predicate. A being is not more perfect by existing or by not 
existing. What is however of importance here is to nóte that from the very conception 
of God, the argument is that He exists. Crudely, God is willed into existence by our 
conception of Him, although Anselm is careful to note that God is greater than could 
be conceived of. The conception of God is really what is conceived of.
As far as we are concerned, conception is prior to existence. Something will not exist 
for us, that is, its existence is irrelevant for us, unless we have some idea of what it is. 
We modify our behaviour not because of the existence of things, but because of our 
conception of them. Of course, events do happen to us of which we are previously 
unaware, but unless they kill us, our subsequent behaviour is affected by our concept­
ion of them. Likewise when it comes to possession, we do not desire to have an object 
without a prior conception of what that object is. This point is of course made by 
Anselm himself in his assertion that before creation or manufacture, an object exists in 
the mind of its maker.
Crucial to the ontological argum ent is the conception that God is omnipotent, total, 
having everything as a function of his perfection. Prosperity teaching shares this view 
of God. He is able to provide all that his supplicants ask, and so, it is believed, if the 
request is made in the right way, God will answer it. In the latter case, the dominant 
idea is that of the kingship and authority of G od. T herefore because we are his 
children, God is both able and willing to respond to our requests. Prayer made in the 
right way is necessarily answered.
Conception is therefore a vital m atter in prosperity teaching, but in this case goes 
further. The traditional approach to sickness and poverty, apart from attacking them 
in a ‘practical’ way, is to pray about them, bringing the needs to God. Not so, argues
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the new approach. That ‘negative confession’ centres the mind upon the problem and 
in itself is then a cause of the problem. R ather, emphasis must be placed upon the 
solution to the problems. Thus the major technique of prosperity teaching is what is 
known as ‘positive confession’ where visualization of the desired solution, not the 
problem, is used to bring about the result. For example, a leading prosperity teacher 
writes, 'T he Word will work for you when it becomes a reality in your heart" (original 
emphasis) (Copeland, 1978:59), and Hagin (1972:14) himself advises, "see yourself as 
having received". In this it is sim ilar to the visualization concept of such as Peale 
(1953:61), or in modern sales psychology. (O ther techniques are inter alia the ideas of 
seed faith  (M ark 10:30) by which it is believed that G od will repay any gift one 
hundred fold, and "agreeing" (M att 18:19).) Now it is indubitable that a positive 
attitude does produce results, particularly in the latter case, but it is also indubitable 
that the simple application o f positive confession has caused great problems. The 
obvious case is in sickness, where the application of positive confession, the visualiz­
ation of perfect health  has the counterpart of necessarily claiming healing, and so 
d iscontinuing any o th e r form of tre a tm en t, o ften  w ith trag ic  results . Positive 
confession has as its corollary the idea that any doubt, that is, negative confession, is 
also effective in stopping the desired result. The usual text cited here is James 1:6-8: 
"But let him ask in faith, with no doubting ... a double-minded man ... will [not] receive 
anything from the Lord.” This means that any failure to receive either healing or the 
material prosperity prayed for is attributed to doubt. Again what is critical is that the 
conception of the desired result actually causes it to come into existence, o r so it is 
believed.
The ontological argum ent is often phrased greater than can be conceived’ rather 
than greatest possible’, and the contrast made between existence in the mind and 
reality. In fact the idea of conception may be thought to be entirely superfluous, until 
it is rem em bered that Anselm’s purpose was to convince the ‘fool’ who, to his mind 
likewise had a conception of God but did not realize its implications, and so denied the 
existence of God. What Anselm was arguing for was not so much a concept of God, 
but that the ‘fool’ would receive God to H imself as Lord. Likewise the prosperity 
teachers are arguing not for the exercise of the imagination in conceiving of the things 
that may be desired, but for the implication of such visualization. The things, it is 
believed, may be received if visualized correctly. In both cases therefore, correct 
visualization leads to personal possession; a closer relationship, on the one hand, to 
God, and on the other, to the thing desired.
2 2  Infinite merit
A further point of contact between the ontological argument and prosperity teaching,
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albeit a secondary one, derives from the idea of God as infinite, which is an aspect of 
God’s nature implicit in the conception of the ontological argument.
With such an understanding of the perfection of God, it is not surprising that Anselm 
saw the atonement as related to it. With a view of God as infinite, it was a small step 
to the notion of infinite merit available for us in the death of Christ, such that our sins 
are outweighed by the transfer of this merit.
Prosperity teachers stand in the line of American fundamentalism which can trace its 
roots back to the Reform ation and the penal substitution theory of the atonem ent. 
This sees the death of Christ as the infinite penalty for the sins of believers, such that 
Christ dies as a substitute. They extend this idea from substitution for the penalty of 
sin to include the results of sin in sickness and poverty. Thus because Jesus died, 
health and prosperity may be claimed, but with the further assertion of immediate 
rather than eschatological receipt. ‘
Again there  is no historical connection betw een the two sets o f ideas, but it is 
interesting that both relate so strongly to the same basic idea.
23  The objections
Objection to Anselm was not slow in forthcoming. It seems impossible that simply 
from a conception of the perfect can come such a neat argum ent for the age-old 
problem of the existence of God. Another ecclesiastic, as is well known, attempted to 
show a flaw in the argument by outlining a similar statement. He argued that the same 
logic would hold in the case of an island. If such a perfect island could be conceived of, 
then it must necessarily exist. The answer is that the argum ent is only valid if it is 
app lied  to  w hat is the m ost perfec t o f all, and islands are  surpassable in their 
perfection. This means that the argument is only valid in reference to God, not for 
anything else. Such logic must then be taken note of by the prosperity teachers. 
Simply to have a conception of something does not mean that it exists, no matter how 
perfect it is, unless that thing is the most perfect of all, God.
In this regard Hagin and o ther advocates o f prosperity teaching must be seen as an 
advance on the simple positive thinkers. I would exclude Peale here because he does 
base his optimism on more than psychology but rather upon the Fatherhood of God. It 
is how ever hard to  see tha t the position o f Schuller, a  disciple of Peale, differs 
significantly from psychology (cf Schuller, 1982). It can be argued that visualization of 
the desired end and positive thinking is effective, but on a psychological level. It 
generates a mind set which is more likely to  achieve success than a mind full of
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pessimism and defeat. It cannot, however, be argued that this will always work because 
circumstances may be such as to negate the value of positive thought.
Hagin, and like-minded teachers, however stress that their concept of visualization and 
positive confession are more than simply positive thinking, but are effective because 
God is the source of the benefits prayed for. It is only because they are going to the 
ultimate that they can claim such confidence in prayer.
Such confidence is based on the one hand on their conception of the nature of God as 
almighty and loving. They see themselves in covenant relationship with the ultimate, 
so that any request can be answered. Any problem is not on the side of God but of 
men. On the other hand, and this is the source of their idea of God, their source of 
authority is based on a fundamentalist approach to the Bible. They therefore trust the 
Bible as completely the Word of God, totally trustworthy and applicable to any situat­
ion. Therefore they apply texts such as Philippians 4:19, and especially Mark 11:24 
(this is quoted on all Hagin’s booklets), treating them as immediate promises of God.
Both the ontological argument of Anselm and the prosperity teaching of Hagin there­
fore claim validity on the same grounds. The argument, perhaps cleverer in the former 
case, is only valid because it deals with the infinite God and not with any lesser forces.
3. TH E VALIDITY O F TH E ARGUM ENTS
Both arguments consist essentially of two parts, a premise or assumption and a logical 
deduction from that assumption. In the case of the ontological argument the premise 
is the perfection of God, the deduction is His necessary existence. In the case of 
prosperity teaching, the premise is a view of G od’s omnipotence and acts based on a 
fundam entalist approach to the Bible, the deduction is then  a claim of receipt of 
m aterial benefits. I want here to consider briefly the second part, the deduction, 
before moving to what I believe is the heart of the matter, the assumption concerning 
God.
The objection of Kant is essentially that there is no significant difference between our 
conception of things that exist and things which do not exist, and so existence adds 
nothing to a concept. Therefore a thing which exists is not greater, or more perfect, 
than a thing which does not exist. I believe that here we are again dealing with the 
reply to the objection of G aunilo. Anselm was careful to say that it was not his 
conception of God which must exist, but that G od was a being such that nothing 
g rea ter than Him can be conceived at all. Now Anselm is conscious of the gulf 
between himself and God, which is the basis of his entire argum ent; therefore, if
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anyone can have such a conception of God, it is God himself, and this thought leads to 
necessary existence, albeit by circularity.
It is similar God-centredness which is relevant to the prosperity teaching. Hagin and 
others essentially put the initiative with man who is responsible for the faith in God, 
and the conception of the desired object. This must be invalid because it is based on 
m a n ’s idea, just as Anselm 's idea of God does not have necessary existence. The 
validity is based upon the conception being that of God.
It hardly needs to be said that G od’s existence is in no way contingent upon someone’s 
having a conception of him . The ontological argum ent concerns a proof of his 
existence, not a cause of it, but nevertheless God can be said to have a conception of 
Himself which alone would correspond to reality in a way that ours never could. I am 
here reminded of the old idealism where everything was reduced to mind, and the two 
limericks by R onald Knox which so readily describe it, which however relate the 
conception to the mind of God:
There was a young man who said, "God 
Must find it exceedingly odd 
If he finds that this tree 
Continues to be
When there’s no one about in the quad."
"Dear Sir, your astonishment’s odd 
I am always about in the quad 
And that is why the tree 
Will continue to be
Since observed by, yours faithfully, God."
N either of course does the prosperity cult believe tha t visualization or ‘positive 
confession’ brings the desired object into existence, but it does cause its transference to 
the asker. Its receipt is dependent upon the request. Thus a major criticism of the 
prosperity cult must be its anthropocentricity. It sees on the one hand man’s initiative 
in deciding what he wants, with G od’s role that of response and of granting these 
requests. On the other hand, it teaches that this response is contingent upon the faith 
of man. One explanation therefore of the delay in receiving what is prayed for is that 
for large requests it takes a while to build up the necessary faith (cf eg. Sarles, 
1986:343). This is surely a travesty of the theocentricity of Christianity which sees 
m an’s o ther role rather as a response to the will of God, and that all, even faith, is 
given by Him. It is a significant comment that a technique, which claims to work by its 
emphasis on the almightiness of God, at the same time effectively makes God subject 
to the whims of man.
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Prosperity teaching will read its key verse, Mark 11:24, "Whatsoeveryou desire, believe 
tha t you receive it and you will" (em phasis m ine), w hereas as I have elsewhere 
com m ented, o ther indications in the Bible are that prayer is effective only if it is 
conformity to the pre-existing will of God. It is rather God who takes the initiative, 
and then if prayer is made in conformity to that will (as expressed in 1 John 5:14), then 
it will be granted. H ere lies a more correct emphasis, for if the receipt of an object is 
desired by God, so His concept; then our request is valid, and indeed will work.
4. TH E VALIDITY O F TH E PREMISES
From their premises, both the arguments of the prosperity teachers and the ontological 
argum ent may claim some validity. (The ontological argum ent is seen as a valid 
deduction from its premise by such as H artshorne and Malcolm (Plantinga, 1968:123, 
136), or by Barnes, 1972:80.) The major attack on the ontological argument has how­
ever centred on its premise, that of the perfection of God. This is an assumption that 
prosperity teaching also makes, and which is likewise questionable.
4.1 Perfection
Now it may well be valid to argue about the moral perfection of God, such that what is 
right may be defined as conformity to his will, although even this is disputed ground 
today. The question here is ra ther w hether God may be seen as perfect in every 
possible way (or else the objection of Gaunilo becomes valid), and indeed whether 
perfection is a valid concept at all.
It is not true to argue at this point that as we have a conception of perfection, then 
there must be som ething corresponding to that conception (just as the feeling of 
hunger presupposes the existence of food). Such thinking may have seemed valid to 
the ancient G reeks, and indeed is the root of the ontological argument, but must be 
discounted today.
R ather the modern view denies the existence of absolutes in any sphere whatsoever, 
but stresses the key concepts of development or change, and relation. It can only be 
argued that one thing is better than another, not that there is an absolute good. What 
is denied is an infinite entity, qualitatively different conception from the things that 
exist, because there is no evidence whatsoever for this, as there is no evidence for the 
existence of Platonic ideals or universals. A ‘greatest possible’ is then by definition 
im possible because som e qualities such as length or num ber can be added  to 
indefinitely.
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In theology this is expressed in process theology where God is seen, like everything 
else, to be relative and developing. He is only the best at any particular time, but later 
he would be seen as im proved. G od is not transcendent, in the sense of being 
qualitatively different from the world, but is affected by and affects the world, a  theory 
known as panentheism.
I do not believe that such a conception of God, if indeed true, necessarily invalidates 
the ontological argument, because the conception of God envisaged in it is a theoretic­
al and not an actual one, except insofar as it exists in the mind of God. In this case 
God is always ‘perfect’, because his conception of what is perfect at any one time will 
be the most perfect there is, and He will fulfil that conception immediately. (Unless it 
is postulated that G od can only work towards, as a process, conforming H imself to 
what He perceives He ought to be, which in itself is an imperfection which itself must 
be elim inated. But in that case there is a conception of what is perfect which itself 
would exist, giving two gods, which is absurd. Hence God must correspond to His own 
conception of perfection at any time.) However, infinity is a valid concept, and as such 
is used in mathematics with different properties than the simply very large. Thus to say 
tha t G od is the greatest conceivable is to say m ore than  tha t H e is the greatest 
possible. It is to add a qualitative difference. Such a difference is also present in 
prosperity thought, although the implications of their view have not, I believe, been 
appreciated. A doctrine of the receipt of what is desired is possible, other things being 
equal; provided, on the one hand, that the desire is not too large, or that too many 
people are not desiring. If the world is finite, it is patently absurd to say that all prayers 
will necessarily be answered. Prosperity doctrine, if pressed to its logical conclusion, 
demands a limitless supply of what could be acquired, not just a very great one.
4.1.1 The relevance of time
If God is seen as developing in reaction to the world, the concept of time becomes 
vital, for God would be the most perfect only at the end of the world. However, even if 
God is not changing in Himself, the world clearly is in a process of development, and 
moreover, unless God is totally ignoring the world, its final state will be one which God 
desires. In e ith e r case, an eschatological consum m ation or final sta te  becom es 
important in relation to the idea of God’s perfection.
This also means that God must be seen as currently limited, whether inherently as in 
process theology, or, preferably to the writer, by choice. (The concept of ^ //-lim itation 
does not fall into the trap of Kenoticism where Christ is limited from without.) God 
does not wish to bring in the final state immediately. It can also be seen as necessary
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for the sake of the genuine free-will in men.
A realization of a changing world leads therefore to two significant concepts, those of 
the current (self-)limitation of God, and that of eschatological, ra ther than present, 
perfection . Both of these a re  foreign to  both the ontological argum ent and to 
prosperity teaching. The ontological argument belongs to a world view which effective­
ly ignores eschatology, where the em phasis falls upon stability, and thus where 
p erfec tio n  is a possible concept. Likewise, I believe th a t a loss of a sense of 
eschatology has been one of the causes of the prosperity doctrine. The loss of the 
sense of future has led to a concentration on the present, and as a result, biblical 
promises such as 2 Corinthians 9:6 are treated  as having a necessarily im m ediate 
fulfilment. In the same way, the hint of any limitation in God, as it is foreign to the 
m edieval world view of the ontological argum ent, is also ignored by prosperity 
teaching.
Their argument is of a God totally loving, totally king, totally able to answer prayers. 
However, as the age-old dilemma of evil makes clear, this simply does not correspond 
with reality. Either God is not all loving, or he is not all-powerful. There is no other 
explanation for the facts. The solution to this must be seen in the second half of the 
dilemm a. Although God is all-loving, he has chosen to limit himself. T here is a 
distinction to be drawn between the ability of God and what he chooses to do. Because 
of his love, and for the sake of our real free will, he has limited himself (and self­
limitation to the ultimate on the cross), but has nevertheless acted to redeem us from 
the effect of the sins which followed from human free-will so that the ultimate good is 
greater than if God had not limited Himself. As Augustine inferred, it is better to have 
sinned and to have been redeem ed than never to have sinned at all. Such a self­
limitation means that God, at the present, does not answer all requests made to him. 
The assumption that God as a loving Father (Peale’s emphasis) or omnipotent king 
(prosperity teaching) must give us all that we want, must be qualified. Even if we 
assume that the premise is true, it does not follow that we will receive whatever we ask 
for. A mom ent’s reflection shows us that no father will give his children everything 
that they ask for; it is simply not the best for them. His love and care simply forbids 
agreeing with every request. A wise king also will not g rant all the desires of his 
subjects. W ith his grasp of the workings of sta te  he frequently  appreciates that 
granting requests may sometimes seem very attractive, but ultimately is detrimental. 
Again validity of the assumption does not lead to validity of the argument unless it is in 
full relation to God.
Nevertheless, if the point of such self-limitation is because of love, for the sake of the 
ultimate good, it means that in the end, prayers for prosperity or healing are effectively 
answered, and the ultimate benefit of current suffering or other deprivation is seen to
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be outweighed by the final benefits. For example, healing is seen to be total in the re­
creation of the saved in a spiritual body (1 Cor. 15). Non-receipt of what is asked for in 
prayer is therefore not due to defective faith, but because we live in an eschatological 
world.
42  Comparability
A more cogent objection to the ontological argument is not in its idea of perfection as 
an absolute, for it is evident that perfection may exist. For example, a  perfect square is 
quite possible, and perfect examples of other things not only are possible, but actually 
exist. Rather the assumption implicit in the ontological argument is that all things are 
comparable, so that it is always possible to say one thing is better than another, so that 
God is clearly best of all, or greater than all. Such an assumption is however clearly 
not the case as would be obvious if Anselm’s conception was actual and not theoretical. 
It is not possible, for example, to compare a bear with a beetle, o r a  clock with a car. 
They are simply different. Anselm’s mistake here is of a concept of greatness or 
perfection without relating it to any specific thing. Everything is lumped together 
w ithout regard to individuality. (It is tem pting to  point out here  tha t Anselm is 
following the path of the first sin of Adam and Eve, who were tem pted to compare 
themselves to God, which is really illegitimate. Likewise a large factor in the error of 
the prosperity teachers is that men com pare and then fall into envy and greed.) 
T echnically , A nselm  believes th a t his h ighest P la ton ic  universals loose the ir 
individuality in God, but even leaving aside the existence of universals, why this should 
be is not clear. This ‘fool’ cannot see that God must be the most perfect o f all.
The same thing is true of Descartes’ formulation. It is nonsensical to say that God 
must have everything. Again the mistake is in the lack of specificality. What sense is it 
to say a being has fluidity and solidity, or perfect roundness and perfect squareness?
This point may also be related to the prosperity arguments. Again they are comparing 
two states on one basis, forgetting that in some cases comparison is not even possible. 
Their assumption is that it is always better to be healthy or prosperous, whereas in fact 
for some individuals entirely the opposite may be the case, and so it would be very 
wrong for God to grant requests for health or wealth to them. They are also guilty of 
lum ping every th ing  in to  one single category, and fo rgetting  the individual, an 
interesting thing for a  belief which actually is extremely centred on the individual and 
his prosperity rather that of the community.
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5. CONCLUSION
The assumptions of the ontological argument may therefore be questioned, leading to 
its failure to achieve what is desired. Prosperity teaching, with similar assumptions, 
must therefore also be rejected.
It is doubtful whether anyone has ever been convinced of the existence of God by the 
ontological argum ent. Even Anselm form ulated it from a position of faith. The 
ontological argument is really too full of problems, particularly as regards its premise. 
People come to faith in a less abstract manner. However, it is, I believe, valid to turn 
the argument around, so that if God exists, then he must be perfect, or more exactly, is 
not imperfect in anything. Such a statem ent is almost tautological, but does allow for 
the idea of change, and also for the retention of the idea of God as guarantor of moral 
righteousness, although the juxtaposition of these statements does cause a new set of 
problems.
Similarly I believe that the claim of the prosperity teachers can be turned around to 
give a valid, if reasonably tautological statem ent. In brief their position is that if a 
Christian has faith, God will grant what he wants, or to put it another way, God will 
make him what he should be. If this is turned around, it becomes a situation such that 
if a Christian is indeed what he should be, then he will have the faith to claim from 
God. He will have this because he will be aware of the will of God, and so may pray in 
full assurance, not just faith, that his prayers will be answered.
It is also worth noting that the ontological argument is also valid in a negative sense. 
That is, it is possible to define an object such that its existence becomes impossible, for 
example a square circle. Whether of course it is valid to say that it may be conceived 
of is another matter, but it certainly can be said to exist as a concept, but impossible in 
reality. It is probably also valid to say that the arguments of the prosperity teachers are 
valid negatively. Whereas in a positive sense they want to say that God will give what 
we desire, which is invalid, negatively it is true to say that God will never ultimately 
harm us, as Paul pointed out in a num ber of places (eg. 1 Cor. 10:13, Rom. 8:31-9). 
These are, however, very different matters from a belief in positive blessing.
Anselm’s theory lives on, but as little more than an intellectual curiosity in theology. It 
is unlikely that the acceptance, qualification or rejection of the ontological argument 
has ever really harmed anyone, a statem ent that is unhappily not applicable to pros­
perity teaching, of which the unquestioning acceptance has done great harm, even to 
death (cf W illiams, 1985:22). It is to be hoped that the ideas o f Hagin are soon 
likewise only of historical importance, so that they no longer do the damage that they 
do at present. Just as Anselm’s ideas have been found wanting, so those of Hagin fail
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to prove his case.
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARNES, J. 1972. The Ontological Argument. London : MacMillan, St M artin’s Press.
COPELAND, G. 1978. God’s Will is Prosperity. Fort W orth : Kenneth Copeland Publications.
FRANK, D. W. 1986. Less than Conquerors: How Evangelicals Entered the Twentieth Century. Grand 
R ap ids: Eerdmans.
HAGIN, K. E. 1972. New Thresholds of Faith. Tulsa, O k l: Kenneth Hagin Publications.
PEALE, N. V. 1953. The Power of Positive Thinking. Kingswood Surrey : W orld’s Work (1913). 
PLANTINGA, A. ed. 1968. The Ontological Argument: From St Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers. 
L ondon: MacMillan.
SARLES, K. L. 1986. A Theological Evaluation of the Prosperity Gospel. Bibliotheca Sacra, 143 
(572):329-52.
SCHULLER, R. 1982. Self-esteem : The New Reformation. Waco, Texas : Word.
WILLIAMS, D. T. 1985. Prosperity and Faith: Christian Emphasis or Materialist Syncretism? Fort Hare 
Papers, 8 (l):ll-28 .
WILLIAMS, D. T. 1987. Positive Thinking about Prosperity: A Suggested Origin of the Prosperity Cult. 
Fort Hare Papers, 8(2):64-75.
Koers 57(2) 1992:227-239 239
1240
